Players

Adam Gilchrist by the numbers, and the position he rewrote

A Test average of 47.60 at number seven, at a strike rate no keeper had approached, which changed what every side expected from the position.

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Adam Gilchrist averaged 47.60 in Test cricket batting at number seven and scoring at around 82 runs per hundred balls. Before him, a keeper who averaged 30 was considered a bonus. After him, every side in the world was looking for one who could bat.

The short version
  • 5,570 Test runs at 47.60, batting mostly at seven
  • A Test strike rate of around 82, which was unheard of for the era
  • 416 Test dismissals behind the stumps
  • He walked when he knew he was out, including in a World Cup semi-final

The record

FormatMatchesRunsAverageSpan
Tests965,57047.601999-2008
ODIs2879,61935.891996-2008
Adam Gilchrist's career card showing 96 Tests, 287 ODIs, 13 T20Is and the teams he played for
96 Tests, and an average at number seven that most number fours would take.

The full record is on his player page.

What number seven used to be

Before Gilchrist, the seventh position in a Test batting order belonged to a keeper who could hold a bat.

A keeper averaging in the high twenties was normal, one averaging thirty-five was a genuine asset, and a side that got 40 runs from the position in an innings was satisfied. The keeping came first because dropping catches loses Test matches, and the batting was a tiebreaker between two competent glovemen.

He averaged 47.60 there. That is a number a good number four would accept, produced from a position where the batter frequently arrives with the tail exposed and has to farm the strike.

The strike rate is the point

The average was remarkable and the strike rate was what actually changed matches.

Around 82 runs per hundred balls in Test cricket, in an era when a good scoring rate was in the fifties, means a batter who could turn a session. Australia at 250 for 5 was a competitive score; Australia at 250 for 5 with Gilchrist to come was a different proposition entirely, because 120 in a session was available.

The tactical effect on the opposition was substantial. A bowling side that has worked through the top order and reached the keeper at 250 for 5 expects the innings to be closing. Instead the run rate doubled, the field spread, and the tail — which in that Australian side batted well — got to play against a defensive field.

His 57-ball hundred against England at Perth in 2006 is the fastest by an Australian in Tests and the second-fastest ever at the time.

The keeping, which was not incidental

416 Test dismissals from 96 matches, which is a high rate.

He kept to Warne and McGrath, which is a job description in itself: standing up to a leg-spinner turning the ball sharply out of the rough, and standing back to the most accurate fast bowler of the era with a slip cordon behind him.

He was not the most technically elegant keeper of his generation and he was reliable, which is the property that matters. The criticism, when it came, was that he was a batter who kept rather than a keeper who batted, and the response is that he did both to a standard that won matches.

47.60
Test batting average, mostly at number sevenThe position was expected to produce an average around thirty

The Ashes, and the one series that did not work

His record against England is heavily skewed. He scored freely in Australia and struggled in England, and 2005 was the extreme case: 181 runs in ten innings, with Andrew Flintoff bowling round the wicket to him repeatedly and successfully.

The plan was specific. Left-arm and round-the-wicket angles into his body cramped the full swing, and a fuller length outside off invited the drive without giving him room. England executed it for five Tests and won a series they had not won for sixteen years.

It is the clearest evidence that the method had a genuine weakness, and the clearest evidence of how rarely anybody managed to exploit it: one series in a career, and it required the best all-round bowling performance of the decade to do it.

Walking

He walked when he was out, whether or not the umpire had given him out, and it was unusual enough to become a subject.

The most-cited instance is the 2003 World Cup semi-final against Sri Lanka: he edged to the keeper, the umpire gave not out, and he left anyway. Australia won the match and the tournament, so the decision cost nothing, which is precisely why it is remembered — a gesture that costs nothing is easy to dismiss, and he had made it his consistent practice.

Not everybody approved. The argument against walking is that it is inconsistent — batters walk for edges and never for lbws — and that it puts pressure on team-mates who do not. Both are fair. He did it anyway, for a decade, and it is part of the record.

From the puzzle

The role column narrows it hard, and the Tests number separates him from the other keepers of his era.

COUNTRYAustralia
ROLEKeeper
SPAN1999–08
TESTS96
AVG47.6

What made the batting work

Two technical things, and the second is the unusual one.

He hit the ball very hard and very straight. A left-hander with a full swing and a high backlift, hitting through the line, which is the simplest way to score fast and the hardest to bowl to on a flat pitch.

He did not change his method. Most attacking batters have a defensive gear they switch to when a side is in trouble. He largely did not, which meant Australia at 200 for 5 got the same batter as Australia at 400 for 4.

That second point is why he was occasionally dismissed cheaply in a crisis and why his overall contribution was so large. A batter who plays the same way regardless will lose some matches with it and win far more, and Australia had a top order good enough to absorb the losses.

The bowling response was a short-ball plan, executed by everybody, for a decade. It worked often enough to be worth doing and not often enough to change how he batted.

The one-day career

9,619 runs at 35.89, opening the batting, at a strike rate close to 97.

Opening in one-day cricket with a keeper was another thing that was not done before it worked. He attacked the first fifteen overs with fielding restrictions in place, in an era when openers were expected to survive them, and did it for a decade in the most successful one-day side ever assembled.

He scored 149 in the 2007 World Cup final, and 54 in the 2003 final, and 57 in the 1999 final. Three World Cup finals, three substantial contributions, three Australian wins.

What the position was
  • A keeper who could hold a bat
  • An average around 30 was fine
  • Batting seven, defensively
  • Selected for glovework
What it became
  • A batter who could keep
  • An average under 35 became a problem
  • Batting seven, at 80 per hundred balls
  • Selected for both, and dropped for either

Where he sits in our dataset

Difficulty tier 1 on the player list. Australia, keeper, 1999 to 2008 is a combination with essentially one answer, which makes him one of the quicker puzzles to close once the role appears.

The short version
  • 5,570 Test runs at 47.60 from number seven, in 96 Tests
  • A strike rate around 82, which turned sessions rather than just adding runs
  • 416 Test dismissals, keeping to Warne and McGrath
  • He walked consistently, including in a World Cup semi-final

The short version

He took a position that was defined by its defensive requirements and made it an attacking one, and every side in the world has been looking for its own version ever since. The average is the record; the strike rate is the reason it mattered.

For what the position is judged on, see what a wicketkeeper is judged on, and for the bowler he kept to for most of his career, Shane Warne by the numbers.

adam gilchrist australia wicketkeeping batting
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